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I Background
Authority
On August 1, 1986, during a period of critically high water levels on most of the Great
Lakes, the Governments of the United States and Canada requested by Reference to the International

Joint Commission (Commission) an examination and report on methods of alleviating the adverse
consequences of uctuating water levels in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin.
Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this report is to respond to that part of the Reference calling for: ...an
interim report, focusing on measures to alleviate the present crisis, be submitted no later than one year
from the date the Commission s study board actively begins its work.

and, in a limited way, to the

requirement to; ...propose and evaluate measures which governments could take, under crisis condi-

tions, to alleviate problems created by high and low lake levels... . This report is submitted in a
situation changed considerably from that prevailing at the time of the request as the extremely high
lake levels of 1985 and 1986 have abated substantially.

The Task Force Investigation
Responses to the recent high water level crisis included the Reference from Govemments to the DC and implementation of numerous domestic emergency programs in the various
jurisdictions. Some limited responses to modify the lake uctuations, using available regulatory and

diversion works, were also undertaken including: (a) the temporary storage of water on Lake Supe-

rior, (b) the implementation of Criterion (k) with respect to Lake Ontario regulation (both pursuant to
existing IJC Orders of Approval), and (c) temporary storage of the Ogoki diversion by the Province of

Ontario.

The Commission submitted an initial report to Governments by letters dated November

14 and December 10, 1986. Concurrently, the Commission decided to obtain additional technical

information on all possible crisis measures, using a Task Force composed of IJC staff and specialists
from both countries.
Within the one year study time frame established by the Commission, the Task Force

identi ed measures which could be implemented within approximately one year or less to alleviate
the crisis. The Commission determined that a satisfactory economic and social analyses could not be
undertaken in the available time and should not be attempted. However, signi cant physical effects

were to be identified and direct project costs estimated wherever possible.

Eight major tasks were identi ed and sub- groups established to develop detailed work
plans and undertake the technical evaluations. Complete descriptions of the various measures, with
their limitations and constraints, appear in the individual task reports that have been made available
previously and are summarized in Appendix A. Following completion of the initial work assigmnent,
the Task Force conducted several supplemental investigations that are described in Appendix B.

11 Conclusions
The high lake level crisis, that began in late 1984 and continued until early 1987, obviously no
longer exists.

Fluctuating lake levels are, for most observers, the tangible evidence of variations, primarily in

precipitation (rainfall and snowfall) and secondarily in evaporation, that are created by unpre-

dictable weather patterns. These relationships are illustrated by the 1984-88 rise and fall of the
lakes and precipitation values shown in the following table:

Table 1

Preg'pitatign y

19 Month Toms
mm (inghg )

Michigan-

Ontario

Superior

Huron

Erie

Basin

Basin

Nov. 84 - May 86

1310(51.6)

1550(6l.0)

1560(6l.4)

1510(59.4)

Avg. 66 - 86

1220(48.0)

1300(51.2)

l460(57.5)

l490(58.7)

Nov. 86 - May 88

1080(42.5)

ll30(44.5)

1290(50.8)

1340(52.8)

BasinBasin

1/ Sources: National Ocean Service and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
3.

It is impossible to predict the occurrence (when), the type (above or below average), the

duration (length of time), or the intensity (how far above or below average), of a future trend in

precipitation. Even when a trend is established (e. g., the current trend of below average
precipitation), it is impossible to predict its duration or intensity. Short of a major scienti c
break- through that is not anticipated as of now, this lack of predictability will continue to be
one of the most vexing issues concerning lake levels.

4

Under our present climatic conditions, it should be assumed that extreme lake levels will occur
at irregular intervals and may occur at any point in time.
Previous studies by the DC and others have identi ed various individual measures that are

technically possible to reduce the effects of high water levels such as those that occurred

during the recent crisis. Several of these measures have not been utilized at, all or not utilized

to their full capabilities for various reasons. First, implementation of certain measures would

reduce income or increase costs to various entities and no entity was eager to be the only one
making that sacri ce. Second, the reduction in levels achieved by any oneavailable measure

was considered by some to be minor when compared to the larger impacts of nature in the form
of supplies and the direction and intensity of winds. Third, there was concern regarding the

absence of clear means and lead time to deal with any adverse effects. Fourth and of primary

importance, each measure has both domestic and international implications and there was no
agreement or common understanding among the various Governments and interests on what

should be done.

The Task Force found that a combination of relatively low capital cost measures, utilizing

primarily existing facilities and operated as part of a Great Lakes Basin emergency high water
management plan, could be implemented within one year and could lower extreme high water
levels. The Task Force also found that both structural and non-structural coastal zone management techniques can reduce the adverse effects of high water levels, and should be integrated
appropriately into an emergency management plan.

The implementation of an emergency high-water or low-water management plan requires
agreements between the Governments, and coordination among the various entities that have
the operational responsibility for each individual component.

III Recommendations
In recognition of the recent high level crisis, the abrupt reversal of precipitation and the
ndings of the Task Force, the Commission believes it is prudent to offer further advice and recom-

mendations to Governments at this time.
Recommendation I.
Governments should initiate immediately broad but systematic
discussions of their use of Great Lakes water, as calledfor in the
Commission's January 1985 report on Great Lakes Diversions and
Consumptive Uses.
In reiterating this advice, the Commission s intent is to initiate discussions on the broad
and fundamental issues that bear directly or indirectly on measures Governments could take under low
or high water crisis conditions. Our work under the 1986 Reference to date has revealed a number of
issues, on which there are undoubtedly strongly held but differing views by Governments and interests, and which may signi cantly and perhaps profoundly affect our two countries and the preservation
and utilization of the Basin.

For example:
°

There are differences of opinion regarding the preference for structural versus nonstructural solutions to high water levels.

°

The recent Water Policy issued by the Federal Government in Canada encourages

hydroelectric power development consistent with environmental protection. Consequently any potential action that would reduce hydropower generation, such as a
diversion from the basin, may be viewed differently on the Canadian side of the basin

than in the United States.
°

A technical problem linked to policy matters is the uncertainty of forecasting future
lake supplies and resulting levels. This particular uncertainty is compounded by the
greenhouse potential. The lack of precision on this point becomes a policy issue
because it contains the risk that any degree of protection provided from either extreme
high or low levels will be exceeded or, conversely, never fully utilized. The amount of

risk acceptable will, in all likelihood, vary signi cantly among decision makers.
°

Federal/non Federal cost-sharing has always been subject to debate and changes in
policy. In the case of the Great Lakes, there is the added complexity of two sovereign
nations with quite different divisions ofpowers with their provinces and states. In
addition, the Commission anticipates that closely tied to possible cost sharing concerns
will be issues of distribution of bene ts, the impacts and distribution and redistribution
of disbene ts, and the applicability of remedial, mitigation or compensatory measures.

Further, the Commission believes that these issues are so fundamental to the conduct of
its ongoing, comprehensive study under the Reference, that consultations on both sides of the border
regarding those differences and views should begin now and provision made for the results of these
consultations to be taken into account in the actual study process itself.
Recommendation 2.
As part of their consultations on this report, Governments
should develop coordinated, emergency management plans for
both high and low water conditions, beginning with the
information provided in our initial report (letters of
November 14 and December 10, 1986) and the ndings of the
Task Force.

This recommendation responds to several important concerns.
First, the 1985-86 record high-water levels caused or contributed to extensive property

damages and erosion in both the United States and Canada. In examining this crisis, the Task Force
found a number of measures that are technically possible, using primarily existing facilities, to modify
high water levels although some measures may have adverse effects. Such measures are summarized
in Table 1.
Second, given the complexity of the issues, Governments and interests involved, a con-

siderable amount of time will be necessary following completion of the Commission s comprehensive
study, to reach international and domestic agreements, obtain requisite funding, and implement any
additional comprehensive measures aimed at alleviating the adverse effects of both high and low water
levels. In the interim, the present trend in precipitation could reverse and high-water levels and
attendant damages recur. Finding that greater relief from extreme high water levels could be achieved

for certain interests with improved cooperation among the various affected interests acting in a system
context, the Commission believes that Governments should begin at this time to prepare for and coor-

dinate an interim emergency management response.

Table 2
Summm of Emergency Measures to Modify High
Water Levels Technically Possible in One Year
N rm

nditi

Emer en

11 ' '

Lake Superior Storage

Plan 1977

Plan 1977 with
emergency discretions

Long Lac Diversion

1,400 cfs (40 cms)

0-800 cfs (0-23 cms)

Ogoki Diversion

4,200 cfs (119 cms)

0

Chicago Diversion

3,200 cfs (90 cms)

10,000 cfs (283 cms)

Welland Canal Diversion

9,200 cfs (260 cms)

10,000 cfs (283 cms)

Niagara River

Present outlet

Present outlet plus 1,300
cfs (36 cms) through
Black Rock Lock.

Lake Ontario Out ow

Plan 1958-D
with discretion

Plan 1958-D with

discretion plus ood
protection at Lake St. Peter.

This should be undertaken with the knowledge that any interim plan may need to be revised and

modi ed as a result of the Commission s comprehensive study and other subsequent studies.

Third, given the present low precipitation trend, the consultations suggested above
should also consider the possibility of a low water crisis so that Governments and institutions in both
countries would be able to respond more quickly and effectively to such a situation.

Fourth, the consultations could contribute to the Commission s comprehensive study
as discussed in Recommendation 1 above. For example, the selection of measures for a plan, whether
in a crisis or in the general context of alleviating the adverse consequences of uctuating levels, will

involve reconciling competing interests. This reconciliation may be approached in a number of ways
such as requiring all interests to share the burden of a crisis equally; giving certain interests special
status; or allowing adverse effects to fall naturally where they may.

Recommendation 3.
All levels of government in Canada and the United States act to trther discourage the
construction of new, damage-prone buildings or facilities on the Great Lakes shoreline pending
completion of the comprehensive study.
Given that the recurrence of high water levels is unavoidable, one method of reducing
the potential for future damages is to restrict the use of land in the ood plain. Although this is a

measure under investigation as part of the Commission s comprehensive study, the Commission
believes that the interim implementation of this recommendation is appropriate so as not to preclude
effective future Commission recommendations and Government action. If water levels continue to
recede, development will normally continue to encroach upon the ood plain, thus increasingthe
potential severity of damages caused by future ooding. For those ood plains already developed,

there is of course a more dif cult question of protection versus prevention, which is being addressed
as part of the comprehensive study. But for undeveloped areas, it should be ensured that this land,

whether private or public, remains free of damage-prone structures.
Recommendation 4.

Governments enact measures necessary to insure that further encroachment does not
occur in the connecting channels of the Great Lakes.

Technical studies have shown that various land lls have been placed in the connecting

channels over time and that they have, depending on location, small but incremental effects on river

ows and Great Lakes water levels. This issue of existing and future land lls in the Niagara River is
of particular concern. The Task Force identi ed a number of obstructions in the Niagara River and
estimated that the cumulative effect on Lake Erie water levels is significant. Because of the hydraulic characteristics of the Upper Niagara River, removal and/or modi cation of some of the existing
obstructions, particularly those in the vicinity of the Peace Bridge, should also be considered.
Recommendation 5.
Governments continue the public information and technical activities emphasized
during the recent high water crisis pending completion of the comprehensive study.

As Governments are well aware, there is considerable demand for information during
periods of extreme water levels. The Commission continues to nd signi cant groups of the public
that have the need and desire to be better infomed concerning the hydraulic, economic, social and

biological features and interrelationships in the Basin. The recent high level crisis, and the strong

responses by Governments and others in providing information and technical and nancial assistance, has increased awareness of uctuating lake levels and their consequences. But the Commission stresses that at least during the period of our comprehensive study, programs should be continu-

ing in nature and not just at times of unusual conditions. Particular emphasis should be placed on
those activities having a positive effect such as coastal zone hazard mapping. Such information must
be accessible , so that it is understandable by all interests and allows them to make full use of the
information provided.

Appendix A
Summary, Great Lakes Water Levels Task Force

To International Joint Commission
October 1987

SUMMARY

GREAT LAKES WATER LEVELS
TASK FORCE

TO

INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION

OCTOBER 1987

FORWARD
The Great Lakes Water Levels Task Force undertook a

limited, emergency, flood control study.
It did not include
storm conditions or erosion control; nor were economic, social
or environmental analyses undertaken.
However it did identify
crisis measures, address their technical feasibility, quantify
hydrologic impacts and, where possible, indicate significant
physical effects; all of which can provide an improved basis
for decision making by Governments and the general public.
The Task Force was requested to examine every measure
that could theoretically reduce extreme high water levels.
No

measure was excluded just because it might be trivial or
impractical.

In some cases, measures were taken to their

physical limits in order to test their theoretical maximum
effects.
For example, the maximum physical flow through the

Welland Canal of about 12,000 cfs

(340 cms)

was examined even

though this flow requires the cessation of navigation.

The effects of any measure depends not only on its

size but also on how it is used (when started and stopped and,
where possible, its operation), and the water supplies with
which it must attempt to cope.
The Task Force chose several

different water supply

conditions to test the various emergency measures within each

Task.

In Task 8,

Systemic Effects,

to the same water supplies,

all measures were subjected

i.e., the actual high supplies of

1985 and 1986 followed by three years of average supplies.

Also, each measure was assumed to be in place and its operation
was begun immediately, since it was known that two years of
high supplies were coming.
In the real world,

no one knows what future supplies

will occur.
Consequently, it is unlikely that all measures
would or should be initiated at the same time and the effects
reported herein likely overstate what could be achieved in
reality.
Conversely, it is possible future supplies may be
even more severe than the extreme supplies used in the Task
Force analyses, in which case the effects may be understated.

It is important to recognize that the Task Force
reports and summary do not include a discussion of the many
positive effects that would result from reducing extreme high
lake levels.
These effects would include but are not limited
to: reduced flooding, erosion and pumping costs; improved storm
drainage,

sewage treatment plant operation and recreational

opportunities; possible environmental protection; and they

would occur

along the entire shoreline of every lake.

However,

there is not sufficient information available to make even
qualitative estimates of these effects, and the resources

required for such an effort were beyond the scope of the Task

Force.
Similarly, no attempt was made to quantify those
interests that can better utilize high levels.
On the other

hand,

the measures themselves are more site specific,

several

have been studied previously, and qualitative estimates of
physical impacts were possible in almost all cases.
These have

been included.

Consequently,

the Task Force could not report

equally on all significant physical effects.

INTRODUCTION
Authority
On August 1,

1986 the Governments of Canada and the

United States, in response to record high water level
conditions occurring in the Great Lakes, referred the problem
of fluctuating Great Lakes water levels to the International
Joint Commission for examination and report.
As part of this

effort, the Governments asked for an interim report focusing on

measures to alleviate the high water level crisis existing at
that time.
To obtain the additional information for its
consideration of an interim report, the Commission decided in
September 1986 to use a Task Force approach with membership

composed of IJC staff and specialists from both countries.
This document is a summary of the investigations and findings
of the Task Force.
Background

The Great Lakes and their connecting waterways make up

the largest freshwater system in the world.

Great Lakes water

levels are a dynamic phenomenon; fluctuations in lake levels

may occur short term,

seasonally or long term.

The total water

supplies are the dominant cause of these fluctuations.
Because
of their vast surface area and restrictive connecting channels,
it is usually possible for the system to cope with typical
water supply variations in any given year with a normal range

of levels of one to two feet (0.3 to 0.6 m).
While nature
plays the predominant role in these fluctuations, the influence
of human impacts becomes more of a concern when water levels

are either at the extreme high or low part of their cycle.

During 1985 and 1986 monthly water levels on all of
the Great Lakes, except Lake Ontario, were in most cases the

highest in this century.
Predictions for continued highwater
levels, including Lake Ontario, were not encouraging.
There
was considerable shoreline flooding, erosion and associated
coastal zone problems, with resulting public demands for
Government action.
It could be said that only the unusually
small number of severe storms kept damages lower than

anticipated.

An initial IJC response to the Reference was submitted

to Governments by letters dated November 14,

1986.

and December 10,

In that report the Commission outlined; actions it had

taken, actions recommended be taken by Governments, and
measures to lower water levels which were technically feasible

utilizing existing facilities which mightbe implemented
immediately.
At that time, water levels were
extremely
high
throughout the Basin and the Commission had initiated
additional investigations through the Task Force approach.

Fortunately,

as of the date of this Summary,

the water

Lakes Superior and Ontario are
level crisis has eased.
Lakes Michigan,
slightly below their long term averages.
Huron, and Erie, while still above their long term means by one
to one and a half feet (0.3 to 0.5 m), are approximately one
This change has
foot (0.3 m) below their record 1986 levels.
occurred because of record lgw supplies to the Lakes between

late 1986 and mid-1987; the exact opposite of what occurred in
1985

and

1986.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of the Task Force investigation was to
provide the Commission with technical information on possible
"crisis" action measures.
Because in late 1986 no one could
predict when the crisis conditions would end, it was decided
that all possible measures should be considered which:
1)
2)
3)

could possibly be taken to alleviate problems
created by current (ie - 1986) high lake levels;
could be examined within the one year; and
could be implemented within approximately one
year or less after reporting to Governments.

The Commission decided that a detailed, conventional
benefit/cost analysis should not be undertaken for this
effort.
However significant physical effects were to be
identified and direct project costs estimated wherever possible.
A preliminary scoping of potential measures and tasks
was drafted in September, and reviewed and finalized in
December 1986.
Eight major tasks were identified and staffed
to develop detailed work plans and undertake the technical
evaluations of potential measures within each task.
Measures
initially reviewed, and eliminated from detailed examination
due

to lack of effectiveness or the one year timeframe

requirement,

included:

Black Rock Lock modifications
Trent Canal diversion
weather modification
consumptive use modification
off-stream storage
groundwater recharge

other emergency high water level actions
Great Salt Lake pumping).

(e.g.

Hydrologic impacts (water levels and outflows) of the
various measures consisted of comparing the "no action" (or a

ba51s-of-comparison)

scenario with scenarios assuming certain

emergency measures in effect.

Complete descriptions of the

various measures, together with their limitations and
constraints, appear in the individual task reports.
Membership

the
The Task Force was deliberately structured at

outset to make efficient use of limited resources (time,

personnel and finances)

and to integrate the seperate tasks.

advisors,
Murray Clamen and Don Parsons, Commission engineering
ing
on-go
ded
provi
Force,
served as co-chairs of the Task
The combined Task
direction, and prepared this Summary report.
instances
most
In
1.
Force membership is listed in Table
es.
agenci
their
in
members were assisted by personnel

TABLE l
TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP
Canada

U.S.

Doug Brown
Inland Waters/Lands
Environment Canada

Member Task 7

Andre Carpentier
Ministe de l Environment

Member Tasks 2, 7

Quebec

Doug Cuthbert
Inland Waters/Lands
Environment Canada
I

m

l

Reg Golding

Aids & Waterways Branch

Transport Canada

Jayson Chung
Wisconsin Coastal
Management Program
Richard Bartz
Ohio Dept. of Natural

Member Tasks 1, 7

Member Task 7

Resources

Member Task 1

Thomas Bruns
Indiana Dept. of Natural
Resources

Member Task 7

Co-Chair Tasks 5, 6

William Daley

Member Tasks 2,3,4,7

Member Tasks 2, 3, 8

N.Y. State Dept. of Environ

mental Conservation

Charles LaWrie
Aids & Waterways Branch
Transport Canada
(retired April 1987)

Member Tasks 2, 5, 6

Benjamin DeCooke
Consultant

Member Tasks 1, 2, 5,
and 6

Maurice Lewis
Water Management Branch
Ontario Ministry of
Natural Resources

Co chair Task 7
Member 1, 2, 8

Tony Eberhardt
Buffalo District
U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers

Co-Chair Tasks 2, 4
Member Task 8

Gerry MacMillan
Inland Waters/Lands
Environment Canada

Co Chair Task 3
Member Task 8

Bill Erdle
Buffalo District
U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers
(retired April 1987)

Member Tasks 2, 3, 4

Mac Odell
Ontario Ministry of
Natural Resources

Member Task 3

Neil Fulton
Illinois Dept of
Transportation

Member Tasks 3, 7

Canada

U.S.

Dave Smith
Inland Waters/Lands
Environment Canada

Co chair Tasks 1, 2
Member Tasks 5, 8

Ronald Harnack
Minnesota Dept. of Natural
Resources

Co chair Task 7
Member Tasks 1, 8

Dave Strelchuck
Ontario Ministry of
Natural Resources

Member Task 4

Joseph Hoffman
Pennsylvania Dept. of
Environmental Resources

Member Task 7

Brian Tait
Fisheries and Oceans

Member Task 1

Don Leonard
North Central Div.

Co-chair Task 3
Member Task 8

Peter Yee
Inland Waters/Lands

Co-chair Task 4
Member Tasks 3, 8

Thomas Martin
Michigan Dept. of Natural

Member Tasks 1, 5, 7

Frank Quinn

Member Tasks 1, 4, 5

Ogbazghi (Obie) Sium
Minnesota Dept. of Natural
Resources

Member Tasks 1, 7

Canada

,
.

Environment Canada

U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers

Resources

Great Lakes Environmental
Research Laboratory, National
Ocean and Atmospheric Administration

Ronald Wilshaw

Detroit District

U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers

Co chair Tasks 1, 5, 6

Member Task 8

POTENTIAL MEASURES AND FINDINGS
The Task Force met on several occasions to organize

the various tasks and develop detailed work statements,
including personnel and schedules.
Table 2 lists the eight
tasks and indicates the focus of investigation and objectives
for each.

Task 1 - Lake Superior Storage

The work of this task was divided into two areas.
The
first part addressed the technical feasibility of increasing

the storage on Lake Superior above 602 feet

(183.5 m)

and the

associated physical impacts; the second phase reviewed historic
information on lake levels, datum planes and outflow
relationships to identify the maximum historic Lake Superior

water level.

An evaluation of the stability of the regulatory works

and structures located in the St. Marys

River at Sault Ste.

Marie, Ontario/Michigan was carried out to determine if the
works could accommodate an increased water level.

While the

different structures would be over topped at various stages,

appears that all the structures can accommodate a water level
of about 602.8 feet (183.7 m) measured at the compensating

it

works, resulting in a level of 603.0 feet (183.8 m) on Lake
Superior.
No further raising of the Lake Superior water level
is possible without considerable stability analysis to identify
any necessary modifications.
Any storing of water would
require making departures from Plan 1977,
Superior regulation plan.

the current Lake

The computations showed that it is technically
possible to increase the level of Lake Superior to 603.0 feet
(183.8 m).
This action would increase the level of Lake

Superior between one and one and a half feet (0.3 to 0.5 m)
above that which would occur had the action not been taken.
Downstream water levels would be reduced, depending on the
water supply situation, between 0.67 ft. to 1.02 ft. (20 to 30

cm) for Lakes Michigan-Huron, and between 0.30 ft. and 0.57 ft.
(9 to 16 cm) for Lake Erie.
The above analysis did not include
a procedure to maintain or release the stored water.
Around Lake Superior, the adverse effects on public

and private facilities, and shore erosion were predicted to be
severe.

The environmental evaluation was very broad and not

conclusive and mitigation measures could not be addressed
within available resources.

TABLE 2
THE TASK FORCE
Task

Focus

Objectives

1

Lake Superior

To determine if it is technically possible to raise

Storage

Lake Superior above 602.0 feet (182.5 m), and

identify the significant physical impacts both on
Lake Superior and downstream, and any mitigation

measures that may be required.

To examine historic

Lake Superior water levels.
2

Lake Ontario/

To determine if it is technically possible to lower

St. Lawrence

Lake Ontario levels by removing or modifying some

River

of the existing constraints on Lake Ontario
outflows and identify the significant physical
impacts.

3

Diversions

To determine if it is technically possible to lower

Management

lake levels through changes in existing diversion
rates and identify the significant physical
impacts.

The diversions were the Welland Canal,

the Long Lac and Ogoki diversions, the Chicago
diversion, and the New York State Barge Canal.
4

Niagara River

To determine if it is technically possible to
increase Lake Erie outflows by

various measures and

identify the significant physical impacts.

The

measures involved the Black Rock Lock, the
Chippawa-Grass Island Pool, channel excavation at
the head of the Niagara River,

and removing or

modifying obstructions in the Niagara River and a
Squaw Island diversion.
5

St. Clair/

To determine if it is technically possible to modify

Detroit Rivers

flows in the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers and
identify the significant physical impacts.

Ice Management

To determine if it is technically possible to
improve flows under the ice cover in the connecting
channels and identify the significant physical
impacts.

Inventory of

To assemble available information on coastal
emergency activities including; measures, public
information, forecasting, mapping and damage
resulting from the present crisis.

Emergency Measures

and Shoreline

Management

Activities

Systemic Effects

To evaluate the systemic effect of
various combinations of emergency measures examined
by the other tasks.

-10..

The review of historic water level data showed that
high levels occurred on Lake Superior in 1869 and 1876.
The
task found that the maximum historic level on Lake Superior

likely occurred in August 1876.
When converted to the present
Great Lakes datum, IGLD (1955), using the procedure presently
accepted by the Commission, this level becomes 602.31 feet
(183.6 m).
Task 2

- Lake Ontario/St.

Lawrence River

This task evaluated the technical feasibility of
lowering Lake Ontario levels by removing or modifying some of
the existing constraints on Lake Ontario outflows, the
objective being to increase outflows thereby lowering Lake
Ontario water levels during crisis conditions.
Four constraints were identified for detailed study:
(i)

agricultural land on the shoreline of Lake St. Peter

(ii)

residential, commercial and industrial lands
surrounding Lake St. Louis (Quebec);
navigation depth requirements in the International
Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River; and
maximum outflows during the navigation season.

(iii)
(iv)

(Quebec);

(i)

Adverse impacts on cropland surrounding Lake St.

Peter occur at levels in excess of 16.7 ft. (5.1 m) (IGLD 1955)
at the Sorel water level gauge during the growing season from
late May to the end of October.
Computations showed that

flooding of these agricultural lands during 1986 could have
decreased Lake Ontario's level 0.62 ft. (19 cm) with this
amount being reduced to 0.33 ft.

(10 cm)

by the end of the

navigation season in December.
A number of ways to mitigate
these impacts were described including construction of dykes,

dredging of the St. Lawrence River, purchasing flood easements,
or compensating farmers for damages.
The first three probably

could not be implemented quickly.

(ii) Adverse impacts to residential, industrial and
commercial facilities occur around Lake St. Louis at levels in
excess of 72.25 ft. (22 m).
To remove this constraint requires

protecting these lands and structures around Lake St.

Louis by

major dredging and/or dyking.
Since such measures could not be
completed within one year, it was determined that the Lake St.
Louis outflow constraint would remain.
(iii) Navigation depths in the International Rapids
Section of the St. Lawrence River are provided for in the
Commission's Orders of Approval concerning Lake Ontario
regulation through a minimum water surface profile.
However
-11

operating experience since the Seaway
wasopened has shown that
vessels require a slightly different profile with river levels
above the minimum profile in part of the River (called alert
depths) to provide acceptable depths and velocities for safe
operation.
In this task, it was assumed that the commonly

accepted alert depths used by the navigation entities could
be

reduced by six inches (15 cm) to permit slightly higher Lake
Ontario outflows.
Another scenario with levels reduced to the
minimum profile was also examined.
Depending on the supplies,
the reduction of Lake Ontario levels resulting from the
modification of this constraint ranged from 0.15 ft. to 0.27
ft. (5 to 8 cm) by the end of the navigation season.
Peak
levels in the year of implementation were unaffected in all
cases,

but could be reduced slightly the following year.

(iv) During construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway,
channel enlargements were carried out to provide a maximum
mean
velocity of four feet per second (1.2 meters per second) in
the
navigation channels, which translates into a maximum Lake
Ontario outflow of 310,000 cfs (8,780 cms).
In practice,
navigation has been able to operate with maximum outflo
ws up to
340,000 cfs (9,630 cms) and velocities above four feet
per
second (1.2 meters per second) during high water condi
tions on
Lake Ontario.
As a result, this task investigated two
increases in maximum outflows to 350,000 cfs

(9,910 cms)

and

360,000 cfs (10,200 cms).
Results were similar in both cases;
Lake Ontario would be reduced in the range of 0.09
ft. to 0.32
ft. (3 to 10 cm) during mid-summer, depending on suppl
ies.
By
the end of the navigation season this would have
been reduced

to between zero and 0.10 ft. (3 cm).
unaffected by the flow increases.
If the above

Peak levels were

alert depth and maximum outflow

constraints were not respected, shipping interests
could suffer
significant adverse impacts.
It is simply not known whether
vessels could safely navigate sections of
the river having
higher velocity flows and cross currents.
Impacts to
navigation would be difficult to mitigate.
Other possible
impacts due to increased flows and/or higher
water levels would
be: increased erosion of streambanks; disruption
and potential
loss of wildlife habitat and vegetation; decre
ased efficiency
of storm drainage and sewage treatment facilities
; and slight
reductions in beach width and hydropower gene
ration.
Task 3 - Diversions Management

Starting from the Commission's 1985 report
on this
subject, this task re evaluated certain dive
rsion management
actions that could be taken to moderate
supplies and lower
water levels.
The diversions were the Long Lac, Ogoki,
Chicago,

Welland Canal,

and New York State Barge Canal.

The Long Lac and 0goki diversions,

annual flow of about 5,600 cfs
can both be closed completely.

one
the
800
the

bringing an average

(159 cms) into Lake Superior,
Two scenarios were simulated;

representing a complete stoppage of both diversions, while
other scenario assumed the 0goki diversion was closed with
cfs (23cms) remaining in the Long Lac diversion to sustain
pulp mill at Terrace Bay to avoid major adverse impact to

the town.

Depending on the supplies and the regulation

scenario, the ultimate effect, reached in about two years,

would be to reduce Lakes Michigan-Huron between 0.16 ft.

0.23 ft.
ft.

to

(5 to 7 cm), and Lake Erie between 0.12 ft. and 0.15

(4 to 5 cm).

Physical impacts of altering these two diversions will

occur in both the Great Lakes and Hudson Bay drainage basins

from reductions in flows along the diversion routes and
increases in flows within the natural drainage area.
Shutdown
of the diversions causes reduction of electrical energy
production in the Ontario Hydro system with some additional
reduction at U.S. and Quebec hydro stations.

Complete stoppage

of the Long Lac diversion itself would prevent normal log
driving operations, resulting in closure of the Terrace Bay
pulp mill and the direct loss of approximately 2,500 jobs in
the area as well as impact on the livelihood of approximately
7,500 people indirectly throughout a wider area.
There would
be a direct adverse impact on the fishing and recreation
industries of the area; certain fish spawning and wildlife
habitat areas would be disrupted and there would be increased
hazards to boaters on the rivers.

Indian Reserve No.
Rivers.

Flood flows could affect

65 at the confluence of the 0goki and Albany

The three components of the Chicago diversion
presently withdraw and divert a maximum of 3,200 cfs (90 cms)
from Lake Michigan, as decreed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
This
task examined the possibility of increasing the diversion rate
to a maximum annual diversion of 10,000 cfs (283 cms), a
potential maximum indicated in previous studies.
Computer
simulations of lake levels with the diversion at the above two
rates indicate that levels on Lakes Michigan Huron and Erie
could ultimately be reduced by 0.21 ft.

(6 cm)

(4 cm), respectively, within about two years.

and 0.14 ft.

Significant physical impacts to navigation, as well as
interests that could be flooded along the Illinois waterway,
are associated with a diversion increase to 10,000 cfs
(283 cms).
An operating plan would need to be developed if
flow increases were

contemplated as an emergency measure.
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The existing maximum annual diversion rate through the

However flows in
Welland Canal is about 9,200 cfs (260 cms).
1985 and 1986 declined
to an annual average of 7,900 cfs

(224 cms) due to
the beginning of
program.
It has
flow through the

repairs of a lock wall that failed in 1985 and
a major seven-year canal rehabilitation
been estimated that the theoretical maximum
canal is 11,000 cfs (310 cms) with maximum

water use by all sectors.
If a water level crisis of such
proportions existed that the canal was utilized solely to lower
Lake Erie and upstream water levels, all navigation could be
stopped and flows could possibly reach 12,000 cfs (340 cms).

Computer simulations

comparing lake levels with this latter

extreme flow and the normal 9,200 cfs (260 cms) maximum showed
that Lakes Michigan Huron would be reduced by 0.03 ft. (1 cm)
and Lake Erie by 0.11 ft. (3 cm) after about two years.

Theoretical maximum flows of 12,000 cfs

(340 cms)

through the Welland Canal would have several significant

physical impacts.

There would be complete cessation of

navigation between Lake Ontario and the upper Great Lakes for

the entire period affecting the economies of both countries.
In the canal itself, there is a risk of erosion and bank
'
slumping at any flows in excess of 9,000 cfs (255 cms).
The

maximum flow would also cause flooding around the pondage

basins and over the docks; and increase bank stabilization and
dredging maintenance.
Canal.

cfs

This task also investigated the New York State Barge

The relatively small unregulated

(20 cms),

flow,

estimated at 700

is withdrawn from the Niagara River considerably

downstream from the natural outlet of Lake Erie.

Also,

the

Canal is virtually at capacity without extensive
modifications.
Consequently, this diversion has virtually no

effect on the levels of the Great Lakes and the Niagara River
and cannot be used as a practical means to lower water levels

in an emergency.

Task 4 - Niagara River

This task investigated the following measures in the
Niagara River to increase Lake Erie outflows:
(i)

(ii)
(iii)

increased flows through the Black Rock
, Lock;

modified operation of the

Chippawa-Grass Island Pool Control
Structure;

removal or modification of flow
obstructions;
-14
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(iv)
(v)

channel excavation at the head of the
Niagara River; and
construction of a diversion through
Squaw Island.

(i)

Analysis of the Black Rock Lock and its operation

shows that the existing lock culverts and butterfly valves
in
the lock gates can be operated to discharge 300 cfs and
1,000
cfs (8 cms and 28 cms) respectively with no structural

modifications.
The 1,300 cfs (36 cms) flow increase in the
Niagara River translates into a maximum lowering impact on Lake
Erie of about 0.06 ft. (2 cm) within one year.
Aside from
possible interruptions to recreational boaters, no significant
adverse physical impacts are predicted.
(ii)

Mathematical modelling and actual field

measurements taken in June 1987 suggest there could be some

increase in flow in the Niagara River if the existing control

structure in the Chippawa-Grass Island Pool were operated
to

maintain a slightly lower level when compared with the present
operating procedure.
The amount of Pool lowering is dependent
upon several factors; in particular extended periods of Pool
lowering during the winter would not be feasible because the
risk of ice grounding and jams in the Niagara River would be
high.
Based on the analysis of existing data, it was assumed
that the Pool level could be maintained at a target level of

560 feet (170.7m), one foot (0.3m) below the present operat
ing
range.
It was further assumed that this would translate into a

Niagara River flow increase of about 3,000 cfs (85 cms) which
corresponds to an estimated lowering impact on Lake Erie of
about 0.13 ft (4 cm) after about one year.

Lowering of the Pool level could affect the power
diversion and/or generation at Niagara power plants.
Extended

periods of low levels in the Pool could also adversely affect
local riparian interests who operate water intakes and/or
boating facilities in the area.
A detailed operating plan
would be required if this measure were to be utilized in an
emergency situation.

(iii)
The task identified a number of obstructions in the
Niagara River and estimated the impact on Lake Erie levels of
removing or modifying them.
Taken together, these obstructions
have a significant effect on Lake Erie levels.
Because of the
hydraulic characteristics of the upper Niagara River, shoreline
modifications and/or removal of obstructions in the vicinity of
the Peace Bridge would have the greatest impact on Lake Erie
water levels.
Possible impacts ranged from a reduction of
0.01 ft. (0.3 cm) for removal of the old Buffalo water intake
structure to a reduction of about 0.4 ft. (12 cm) for complete

removal of the Bird Island Pier.
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Removal or modification of these obstructions will

For
cause varying types and degrees of physical impacts.
the
or
Bridge
Peace
the
replacing
or
removing
example,

International Railway Bridge, at considerable expense, would
cause major traffic disruptions; removal of the old water

intake structure is not expected to cause problems but removal

would be difficult and costly since it would take place in
fast moving water.

Dredging of the Niagara River in the vicinity of
(iv & v)
and constructing a Squaw Island diversion
Bridge
the Peace
Flow
structure were also investigated.
control
and
channel
increases of about 10,000 cfs

(283

cms)

each would result if

either of these measures were undertaken.

water levels would be reduced 0.4 ft.

Ontario would rise by about 0.2 ft.
measures.

Maximum Lake Erie

(12 cm)

(6 cm)

while Lake

for either of these

There is a potential for significant adverse impacts

if either of these projects were undertaken.

The Squaw Island

diversion would need to consider possible toxic contaminant
migration, erosion of Strawberry Island and cultural
(prehistoric)

resources.

The dredging proposal would need to

address rock disposal, fishery resources and contamination in
the Niagara River.
Because the investigation showed that
construction required at least two years, neither possibility

was considered practical as an emergency measure.
Task 5 - St.

Clair/Detroit Rivers

The work of this task was divided into three areas:
the first area reviewed historic information to determine the
effect of the dredging and compensating works that have been

placed in the St. Clair/Detroit Rivers; the second area looked
at lowering Lakes Michigan-Huron by removing the compensating
works which have beenplaced over time in the Detroit River;
conversely, the third area looked at lowering Lake Erie by
placing additional works in the St. Clair River to offset the
effect of dredging in that river.
the st.

The task documents the various dredging projects in
Clair/Detroit River system since 1876.
The estimated

net effect of all dredging and compensating works placed to

date in the St. Clair River is a lowering of Lakes
Michigan-Huron between approximately 1.2 to 1.6 ft. (0.4 to
0.5 m).
The effect of such works in the Detroit River on Lakes
Michigan-Huron and St. Clair is negligible.
Removal of the compensating dykes in the Detroit River
would lower Lakes Michigan Huron by about 0.15 ft. (5 cm) and
Lake St. Clair by 0.10 ft. (3 cm).
However the timeframe to
-16..

accomplish this action would extend well beyond one year.
Such
removal would restrict navigation in the river during
construction and may reduce navigation draft throughout the
system.
There could be significant environmental impacts both
during the construction phase and in the longvterm.
Studies indicated it is technically possible to place
sills in the St. Clair River to offset the lowering of Lakes
Michigan-Huron caused by navigation dredging projects, and in
turn decrease inflows to Lake Erie.
Such a project could raise
Lakes Michigan-Huron by 0.6 ft.(18 cm), have adverse impacts to
shoreline interests on those lakes, create transitory but
overall negative environmental impacts and have only a
transitory lowering of Lake Erie water levels.
A staged
construction period could take from three to ten years to
complete.

Task 6

Ice Management

This task investigated the technical feasibility of
improving flows under the ice covers in the connecting
channels.
The review included an examination of the ice
formation and dissipation forces in the Great Lakes connecting
channels and the St. Lawrence River, current ice management
structures such as ice booms, and measures to improve flow

conditions during the ice season.
Winter navigation and
documentation of the severe 1984 ice jam in the St. Clair River

were also reviewed.
the St.

The task noted that the present use of ice booms in

Marys,

Niagara and St.

Lawrence Rivers has increased

winter outflows, reduced ice jamming and/or improved local
conditions.
The task found that placement of an ice boom in
the St. Clair River should help prevent jams caused by the flow
of Lake Huron ice into the channel.
Using a simplistic
assumption that such a measure would totally eliminate the

present average ice retardation in the river, there would be a
calculated maximum lowering effect on Lake Superior of 0.09 ft.
(3 cm) and on Lakes Michigan-Huron of 0.12 ft. (4 cm) while the
average level of Lake Erie would rise by 0.05

ft.

(2 cm).

The

reduction or elimination of ice jams would be of considerably
more significance.
Summary of Hydrologic Impacts

Tables 3a and 3b summarize the measures investigated
by tasks 1 through 6 and present a sample of hydrologic
impacts.
These tables should be used with caution because the
impacts cannot be added and represent a theoretical range which
can vary considerably depending upon supplies and other
conditions.

Task 7 -

Inventorv of Emergency Measures and

Management Activities

Shoreline

This task was one of data gathering and no lake level

or flow management actions were intended.

Listed below are the

shoreline management activities and initiatives where each
individual jurisdiction was asked to provide information.
The
inventories included both existing policies, programs and
activities and items being planned for implementation in the

near future:

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0

Emergency Measures
Education/Public Information
Storm Warning/Forecasting
Hazard Mapping
Analysis of Storm Frequency, Duration and Direction
Estimated Damages
Public and Private Facilities/Environmentally
Sensitive Areas
Land Use Management Policies and Programs.

The availability and reliability of data and
information varied widely and each jurisdiction did not provide
information on all the inventories.
Pending completion of this

task,

Task 8

a Supplement may be issued.

Systemic Effects

This task, made up of the co-chairs of the first

seven tasks,

evaluated the hydrologic impacts of various

combinations of emergency measures examined by the other
tasks.
The evaluation compared Great Lakes water levels and.
outflows under a no-action (basis-of-comparison) scenario
with
three different scenarios summarized in Tables 4a and
4b.
Scenario 1 is a supply control scenario with no
direct implementation costs; Scenario 2 builds on the
first
scenario and adds additional measures that could be imple
mented
quickly with little capital outlay; Scenario 3 is a theor
etical
maximum effect, requiring significant expenditure and
time.

A five-year study period was selected starting with

the actual lake levels of July 1987.

Although the extreme high

water levels of 1985-86 had declined, significantly
high water
levels were still occurring on the middle Great Lakes
.
This
time span was considered to be sufficiently long enoug
h to
identify the effectiveness of the maximum impact of\th
e
emergency measures and to allow for the possibility
of high
supplies recurring . During the first two years, the
study
assumed supplies to be the record high supplies that
occurred

during the period August 1985 to July 1986.
years, the study assumed average supplies.
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For the next three

Table 5a and 5b summarize the changes in lake levels

produced by each of the three scenarios.
Tables and graphic
plots of monthly water levels for each Lake, each scenario,
and
the base case, are presented in the report of this task.
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TABLE 3a
SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY MEASURES
TASKS 1 THROUGH 6

MEASURE

TECHNICALLY
POSSIBLE IN
ONE YEAR
Y/N

U9 to 603 ft.
Greater than 603 ft.

Lake Ontario

Lake St.

Peter

ERIE

ONTARIO

-0.30 to

I
I

-o.15
-o.14
-o.11

I

o

-o.03

I

I
I

-o.23

v I

-

N

-

-

-

-

I
I

-

-

0.57

I
I

-

I
I

Ogoki/Long Lac shutoff
Chicago 10,000 cfs
WeTTand 12,000 cfs
NYSB CanaI

>-> >-z

Diversions
Management
,

>-> >-

AIert Minus 6 in.
Min. Profiie
Maximum Outf10w

0 67 to -1.02

I
I

Lake St. Louis
AIert Depth

MICHIGAN/
HURON

I
I

ReguTation

SUPERIOR

+1.0 to +1.5

>- Z
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Lake Superior
Storage

TYPICAL HYDROLOGIC EFFECTS (FEET)

.15 to -.27
.13 to +.38
-.09 to .32

-

TABLE 3a (CONTINUED)
TASK

MEASURE

Ice Management

ERIE

ONTARIO

-0 16
-0.16

0.42
0.42
-0.13
0.06

+0.19
+0.19
negligible
negligible

__
__
-

---

-o.12
-o.4o
-o.o7
-o.01

-

negligible
negligible

-

-

-o.11
o.oe

-

-

o.o7
-o.01

-

-0.15

+ temporary

+ temporary

temporary

- temporary

Int l R.R. Bridge
Utvich Fill

ZZ

St. Clair/
Detroit Rivers

Z>-Z

Peace Bridge

Nicholl s Marine
Buffalo S.T.P.
Bulkhead

22222
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Obstructions
Ice Boom
Bird I. Pier-breach
remove
Mather Park
Buffalo Nater
Intake Structure

MICHIGAN/
HURON

I
l

Black Rock Lock

SUPERIOR

I
I

CGIP

TYPICAL HYDROLOGIC EFFECTS (FEET)

CO

Squaw I. diversion

Channel excavation

ZZ>->-

Niagara River

TECHNICALLY
POSSIBLE IN
ONE YEAR
Y/N

-

Remove dykes
Detroit River
Install sills

N

-

N

+0.21/

+0.59

St. Clair River
Ice Boom

N

0.09

-0.12

St. Clair River

1/ Estimated subsequent to Task 5 report.

+0.05

TABLE 3b

SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY MEASUESS
TASKS 1 THROUGH 6

TASK

MEASURE

TECHNICALLY
POSSIBLE IN
ONE YEAR
Y/N

Lake Ontario

Lake St.

-

20 to -30

-

ERIE

ONTARIO

-9 to -17

-

-

-19

-

5 to 8
-4 to +12
3 to -10

I
l
7 4

-

I

m

I

I
I

-

I
I

I
I

>->->-z

-

I
I

Ogoki/Long Lac shutoff
Chicago 283 cms
Welland 340 cms
NYSB Canal

+30 to +45

MICHIGAN/
HURON

I
I

Alert Minus 15cm
Min. Profile
Maximum Outflow

>->->-
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Diversions
Management

Peter

Lake St. Louis
Alert Depth

SUPERIOR

I
I

Regulation

>- Z

Up to 183.8m
Greater than 183.8m

>-Z

Lake Superior
Storage

TYPICAL HYDROLOGIC EFFECTS (CENTIMETRES)

TABLE 3b (CONTINUED)

TASK

TECHNICALLY
POSSIBLE IN
ONE YEAR
Y/N

MEASURE

Squaw I. diversion

Channel excavation

CGIP

Black Rock Lock

-remove

Peace Bridge

Nicholl s Marine
Buffalo S.T.P.
Bulkhead

St. Clair/

Detroit Rivers

Ice Management

5
-5

ERIE

ONTARIO

13
-13
-4
-2

+6
+6
negligible
negligible

22

Int l R.R. Bridge
Utvich Fill

negligible
negligible

MICHIGAN/
HURON

Z>-Z
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Mather Park
Buffalo Water
Intake Structure

SUPERIOR

ZZZZZ

Obstructions
Ice Boom
Bird 1. Pier breach

ZZ>->-

Niagara River

TYPICAL HYDROLOGIC EFFECTS (CENTIMETRES)

Remove dykes

Detroit River
Install sills
St. Clair River

St. Clair River
Ice Boom

1/ Estimated subsequent to Task 5 report.

+ temporary + temporary
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- temporary - temporary

TABLE 4a
SYSTEMIC SCENARIOS (CMS AND FEET)
Base Case

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

0

0

0

5,600

Long Lac/Ogoki
Lake Superior 0utf1ow

P1an 1977

P1an 1977

Storage range from

3,200

10,000

10,000

St. C1air - Detroit R.

present
out1et

present
out1et

present
out1et

Ne11and Cana1 Diversion

9,200

9,200

present
out1et

present
out1et

Chicago Diversion
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Niagara River

10,000

50% reduction
in ice
retardation(3)
10,000 cfs
increase in Det.
River (4)

11,000

11,000

4,300
increase(1)

8,000
increase(2)

P1an 1958«D with discretion (it was not necessary to modify

Lake Ontario

any constraints)

(1)
V

602.3 to 603.0

(2)

(3)
(4)

due to the use of the B1ack Rock Lock (1300 cfs)
and CGIP 1owering (3000 cfs)
due to the additiona1 3700 cfs increase by removing
se1ected obstructions
due to p1acement of an ice boom at the head of the
St. C1air River
due to remova1 of compensating dykes in the Detroit
River

TABLE 4b
SYSTEMIC SCENARIOS (CMS AND METRES)
Base Case

Long Lac/Ogoki

159

Lake Superior Outflow
Chicago Diversion
St. Clair

Scenario 1

Detroit R.

Plan 1977

0

Plan 1977

90

283

present

present

outlet

outlet

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

0

Storage range from
283
present

outlet

0

183.6 to 183.8
283
50% reduction
in ice

retardation(3)

283 cms
increase in Det.

River (4)
-25-

Welland Canal Diversion

Niagara River

260

260

310

310

present
present
120
224
outlet
outlet
increase(1)
increase (2)
Plan 1958-D with discretion (it was not necessary to modify
any constraints)

Lake Ontario

(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)

due to the use of the Black Rock Lock (36 cms) and
CGIP lowering (84 cms)
due to the additional 104 cms increase by removing
selected obstructions
due to placement of an ice boom at the head of the
St. Clair River
due to removal of compensating dykes in the Detroit
River

BELLE!
SUMMARY OF SYSTEMIC IMPACTS (FEET)
AFTER YEARS INDICATED

Scenario 1
Zgyears

Scenario 2

5 years

2 years

Scenario 3

5 years

2 years

5 years

Lake Superior

0.3

-0.2

+1.3

+2.1

+1.3

+2.1

Lakes Mich Huron

0.3

-O.7

1.1

1.3

-T.2

T.5

Lake Erie

-0.2

0.4

0.9

-1.1

1.0

~T.2

Lake Ontariol/

-o.4

o.2

i.3

-o.4

-1.0

0.2

Note: Positive vaiues indicate Teveis raised and negative values indicate
ieveis Towered.

1/

Changes in Teveis shown for a1] Lakes except Ontario are essentiaiiy the

maximum change for that Lake.

The maximum changes on Ontario are:

Scenario 1:

0.7 ft. (after 3 years)

Scenario 2:

1.7 ft. (after 2 years)

Scenario 3:

1.3 ft. (after 3 years)
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TABLE 5b

SUMMARY OF SYSTEMIC IMPACTS (CENTIMETRES)
AFTER YEARS INDICATED
Scenario 1
2 years

Lake Superior
Lakes Mich Huron

Lake Erie

Lake Ontariol/

5 years

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

2 Years

5 years

2 years

+64

+40

+64

37

46

37

-9

-6

+40

9

21

34

-6

12

-27

-34

-3O

-12

-6

-4o

-12

3o

-40

5 years

-6

Note: Positive vaIues indicate Ieveis raised and negative vaTues indicate
TeveIs Towered.

1/

Changes in IeveIs shown for a1] Lakes except Ontario are essentiaTTy the
maximum change for that Lake. The maximum changes on Ontario are:
Scenario 1:

21 cm (after 3 years)

Scenario 2:

52 cm (after 2 years)

Scenario 3: - 40 cm (after 3 years)
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Appendix B
Supplemental Investigations

After the Task Force completed its primary work in October 1987, the Commission

initiated several supplemental investigations which are described below.

By letter of October 13, 1987 the Commission requested its International Niagara
Board of Control to conduct a eld test on the operation of the Chippawa-Grass Island Pool (CGIP)
Control Structure to evaluate the possible effect of the structure on Lake Erie water levels. A report
summarizing the results of the field test, conducted in December 1987, was submitted to the Com-

mission in May 1988. The report indicates that although some problems occurred during the test

period, considerable data was collected using the acoustic velocity meter (AVM) already in place in

the Niagara River for demonstration purposes. The Board concluded that the data collected in the

test were much more reliable than those of earlier tests. However, as with the tests conducted by the
Board in May 1974 and June 1987, the December 1987 test encountered a similar problem of

constantly changing water levels in eastern Lake Erie. These occurrences made it extremely dif cult
to measure the very small differences in Niagara River ows that are theoretically possible by
changing Pool levels. The Board s analysis of the data did not identify any measurable effect on
Lake Erie out ows due to changes in the CGIP level. Accordingly, the Board recommended that no
further tests be carried out in the CGIP and upper Niagara River until better proven technologies in
ow measurement exist.

By letter of October 13, 1987 the Commission requested the US. Army Corps of
Engineers to test the Corps Black Rock Lock at Buffalo, New York. Water was to be discharged
through the lock by opening butter y valves in the lock miter gates and simultaneously opening the
lock lling and emptying systems. This combination was previously tested in 1987 for about 24
hours. However, the further test of one month was required to determine whether the lock could be
operated for a longer period of time, and also to receive advice on maximizing availability of such
operations with regard to winter conditions, maintenance or other limiting factors. The test was
initiated in July and completed in August, 1988 with no reported adverse effects.
Further review and consultation regarding the Long Lac and Ogoki Diversions

indicate that potential adverse effects on environmental and certain economic and recreational
interests as indicated under Task 3 and the Task Force Summary may be overstated.
As the Task Force was completing its work, it was suggested that the Black Rock
Lock could be modi ed quickly to achieve a design out ow capacity of about 12,000 to 15,000 cfs

(340 to 425 cms). Although further investigation of this concept is being undertaken as part of the
Commission s comprehensive study, results to date indicate that incremental control of ows

through the lock could be achieved by a set of stackable, steel stoplogs installed and removed as
necessary by a permanent stiff-legged derrick at a rst cost of about $3.5 million (1988 US. dollars)
with a maximum design ow of 15,000 cfs (425 cms). Further investigation is underway regarding

navigation requirements and potential enviromnental impacts. However, recent maintenance investi

gations have revealed signi cant voids behind the lock walls. Consequently, the lock cannot be
considered structurally suf cient for these large ows until after rehabilitation is completed in 1989.
The Task Force investigated several contraints that limit out ows from Lake Ontario.

One of these is the threat of ooding of agricultural lands immediately adjacent to Lake St. Peter in
Quebec during the growing season. Recently, the Commission has been informed that private
conservation organizations, land owners andthe Provincial Government have entered into negotia-

tions with a view to purchasing some ood-prone land for duck habitat and protecting other land by

dyking. It is expected that the outcome of these negotiations will be important and could affect the
regulation of Lake Ontario, particularly during high water conditions. The Commission along with

with its International St. Lawrence River Board of Control will be monitoring developments as part
of its ongoing responsibilities under our Orders of Approval.

The Task Force estimated that the theoretical maximum ow through the Welland
Canal is 11,000 cfs (31 l cms) with maximum water use by all sectors. However, at any flow sub

stantially in excess of approximately 9,000 cfs (255 cms), there is a risk of erosion and bank slumping in the canal itself. Further discussions with St. Lawrence Seaway of cials indicated that the
maximum allowable

ow may be 10,000 cfs (283 cms).

The Task Force inventoried readily available damage estimates due to high lake levels
during 1985-1987, and estimated some damages if levels increase beyond those experienced previ-

ously. Subsequent to the Task Force completing its work on this matter, the following reports were
released which provided additional shore-damage related information for Lake Superior:
( 1)

Environment Canada

Lake Superior Canadian Commercial and Industrial Shore Property Survey ; Christian
Stewart, Burlington, Ontario, February 1988;

52 pp.
(2)

Ontari Min'

ofN ur
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Report on Lake Superior Shore Property Damage Economic Evaluation and Social Impact
Assessment ; Marshall, Macklin, Monaghan Limited; Don Mills, Ontario, 1988.
(3)
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n
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"

tin

Govemor s Task Force on High Great Lakes Water Levels Final Report ; December 1987,
17 pp.

Finally, the Task Force evaluated the systemic effects of various combinations of
emergency measures. Further computations, using a different combination of measures than those
originally selected by the Task Force, were undertaken. Table 3 summarizes the maximum impacts

of this scenario on the lakes for the period of time indicated.

Table 3

Systemic Impacts Feet (Centimetres)
After Years Indicated _1/

1 year

Lake Superior
Lakes Mich-Huron
Lake Erie
Lake Ontario
Note:

y

+0.7 (21)
- 0.7 (21)
- 0.4 (12)
- 0.4 (12)

2 years

+0.6
- 0.6
- 0.5
1.0

(18)
(18)
(15)
(30)

5 ears

+1.4
- 1.1
0.8
- 0.5

(43)
(34)
(24)
(15)

Positive values indicate levels raised and negative values
indicate levels lowered.

This additional scenario assumed the same supplies and time period as Task 8 in the Task

Force investigation. The speci c combination of measures is:
Long Lac/Ogoki Diversion
Chicago Diversion

Welland Canal
Black Rock Lock
Lake Superior

800 cfs (23 cms)
10,000 cfs (283 cms)
10,000 cfs (283 cms)
1,300 cfs (36 cms)
Emergency discretion to
602.3 feet (183.6 m)

